UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 16
Issue 1 Journal of Computer & Information Law
- Fall 1997

Article 6

Fall 1997

Commercialism and the Downfall of Internet Self Governance: An
Application of Antitrust Law, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
125 (1997)
David A. Gottardo

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Computer Law Commons, Internet Law
Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Gottardo, Commercialism and the Downfall of Internet Self Governance: An Application of
Antitrust Law, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 125 (1997)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol16/iss1/6
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized
administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

COMMENTS
COMMERCIALISM AND THE
DOWNFALL OF INTERNET SELF
GOVERNANCE:
AN APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

I looked, and there before me stood a pale horse! Its rider was named
Death, and Hades was following close behind him.'
To many users 2 of the Internet, the above phrase may represent an
1. Revelation 6:8.
2. Originally, the Internet consisted of an uncommercialized medium of communication. See Jeff Pelline, Junk Email Victims Fight Back (visited Mar. 7, 1997) <httpi/
www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,5288,00.html>. However, intrusive on-line advertisements
and commercialism are presently invading the Internet. Id. Many Internet users dislike
this surge of commercialism. Id.
[Ilncreasingly there's a culture clash about the practice [of sending unsolicited email advertisements], thanks largely to the noncommercial origins of the Net. Not
too long ago, the Internet largely was the domain of researchers and scientists who
used the network to communicate on lofty projects. Now, of course, it is becoming
a mass medium, with commercialism as its main ingredient. To many users, that
spells frustration.
Id. See also Ken Brown, Valley Woman Reveals Path to Fortune on the Internet, Bus. J. PHOENIX, Jan. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7466841 ("The Internet, in all its incarnations, is almost completely inundated with commercialism .... It was really pie-in-the-sky
to imagine that it wasn't going to happen. You didn't have to be a rocket scientist to figure
that one out, even then.") Growing commercialism also produces technical problems with
the Internet. See Larry Lange, Bandwidth Becomes Big Business, OEM MAG. June 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8758471.
[Wihat was once an ivory tower of data networking... is morphing into Internet
Inc ....
[T]he problem is not just about researchers bedeviled by slow connections ... its about the growing mass of PC users whose embrace of the Internet is
bringing the giant network of networks to its knees. What commercial users once
called "surfing the Web" is now generally known as wading through mud .... [As]
more and more users employ it as a low-cost conduit for ... e-mail and electronic
commerce . . . service providers [at a minimum] will have to install more

bandwidth.
Id.
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omen for current Internet regulation. Growing on-line commercialism
will spell the Death of Internet self-governance, with Hades, the federal
government, following closely behind. 3 In 1981, the Internet comprised
fewer than 300 host computers. 4 This number increased to 90,000 by
1989 and to 1,000,000 by 1993. 5 Continued growth occurred, with the
number of host computers linked to the Internet exceeding 9,400,000 by
1996.6 Finally, by December of 1996, the total number of computers ac7
cessing the Internet had grown to approximately 35,000,000.

As the popularity of Internet use continues to grow, so does on-line
commercial activity. Commerce on the Internet grew from $6,700,000 in
1994 to $103,000,000 in 1996.8 According to a recent survey, the value of
goods purchased by shoppers using the Internet will reach
$1,300,000,000 in 1997, growing to $7,000,000,000 by the year 2000. 9
Correspondingly, on-line advertising campaigns have grown to support
this emerging commerce. 10 The Direct Marketing Association, a Washington D.C. trade group, estimated that more than half of the direct marketers in existence now use the Internet as a medium for their
3. See Jim Erickson, Advent of Junk E-mail Raises Host of Questions, J. REC., July 3,
1995, available in 1995 WL 6388916 (noting that government regulators now recognize the

problem of unethical on-line marketing tactics).
Direct-mail solicitors have discovered the Internet and the on-line world of electronic commerce. The chance that one's e-mail box will remain a pristine file for
personal communications has passed. The computerization and automation of
what many consider to be boorish marketing tactics is not without controversy.
The advent of junk e-mail is raising privacy questions among consumer advocates
and government regulators alike.
Id. (emphasis added).
4. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
5. Id.
6. Id. This number of host computers linked to the Internet does not include personal
computer users who access the Internet with a modem.
7. Thomas E. Weber, Who Uses the Internet, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R6.
8. OnlineAdvertising is The Largest Partof Internet Market, INTERNET WK, Mar. 10,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8289051 [hereinafter Online Advertising]; cf.
Tricia Owen, IncreasingInternet Sales PutsAdvertising Focus on Web Pages, SAN ANToNIO
Bus. J., Mar. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7602901 (stating that sales via the Internet
increased from $8 million in 1994 to $436 million in 1995).
9. Miguel Helft, Commerce on the Web: Who Do You Trust?, L.A. TaMEs, Mar. 10,
1997, at D1.
10. Businesses now recognize that the Internet is an important tool to reach the
masses. See Businesses to Earmark More Ad Dollarsfor the Internet, INTERACTrVE MicrG.

NEws, Mar. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8474809 [hereinafter Businesses]. Furthermore, Cahners Business Confidence Index reported that 40% of companies plan to increase
spending on advertisements on the Internet. Id. See Internet Advertising Survey Finds
Steady Growth, NEWSBYTEs, Dec. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12028250 (stating that
companies advertising on the Internet experienced a steady growth in sales revenue).

19971

DOWNFALL OF INTERNET SELF GOVERNANCE

127

advertising campaigns. 1 Another survey reported that on-line advertisement expenditures reached $12,400,000 in the last quarter of 1995,
with that number growing to $74,000,000 through 199612 and finally to
an estimated $400,000,000 by the end of 1997.13 The reason for this
to a mass augrowth is obvious; the Internet can deliver advertisements 14
dience for less money than traditional advertising means.
15
Numerous on-line advertising methods exist on the Internet.
16
Spamming
"Spamming" is one of these on-line advertising methods.
amounts
large
distributes
indiscriminately
user
Internet
occurs when an
numto
large
messages,
of
e-mail
form
in
the
information,
of unsolicited
7 Both Internet users and service providers
1
users.
Internet
of
other
bers
11. Erickson, supra note 3.
12. Peter Brown & Richard Raysman, Regulating InternetAdvertising, N.Y. L.J., May
14, 1996, at 3, 3 [hereinafter Brown & Raysman]; cf. Online Advertising, supra note 8 (noting that on-line advertising revenues reached $8,900,000 in 1994, $25,000,000 in 1995, and
$156,600,00 in 1996).
13. Lee Hall, New Media: The Web Campaign is Over For Once-Busy Politics-Now
Site, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 10, 1997, at 14.

14. Internet advertisements reach an estimated 20,000,000 people in the United
States. Brown & Raysman, supra note 12, at 3. See also Erickson, supra note 3 (stating
that the Internet presents an "unprecedented opportunity" for marketers to reach a large
number of people while simultaneously reducing advertising costs). Smaller firms are
likely to invest in on-line advertising because this type of advertising allows the smaller
firms to reach the same number of potential customers that the larger firms are able to
reach. See Businesses, supra note 10 ("What we're seeing is these small companies seem
more optimistic about the ability of the Internet to be a way of communicating to a very
wide audience... without spending all their money on other forms of advertising.").
15. See Dee Pridgen, How Will Consumers Be Protected on the Information Superhighway?, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 239-43 (1997) (illustrating that four different types of
advertising methods exist on the Internet: (1) spamming - the electronic equivalent of junk
mail; (2) classified advertising services; (3) individual commercial advertisement sites on
the World Wide Web; and (4) cyber malls, a web site possessing multiple, interactive
advertisements).
16. See LANCE ROSE, NETLAw: YouR RiGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD, 41 (1996) (discuss-

ing how "spamming" first occurred in 1993 when two Arizona attorneys sent e-mail advertisements of their immigration law practice to thousands of Internet users, drawing
thousands of angry e-mail responses in return); David J. Loundy, Lawyers' ElectronicAds
Leave Bad Taste, Cm. DAILY L. BuLL., Mar. 9, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Loundy] (detailing an
analysis of spamming activity of the Arizona attorneys). See also James Coates, Cyberlynched! A Victim of Mob Justice on the Internet Lives to Tell the Tale, Cm. TRm. TEMPO,
Jan. 16, 1997, at 1 ("[Spamming] started when Laurence A. Canter and Martha S. Siegel,
two Scottsdale, Arizona immigration attorneys, made the fatal mistake.., of sending unsolicited e-mail to all members of more than 9,000 Internet news groups advertising their
legal services ....

Uncounted thousands of angry [users] responded to the two hapless

barristers by inundating them with e-mail complaining about [their] unsolicited e-mail.").
17. See Coates, supra note 16, at 1 (statement of Constance Hale, author of Wired
Style: Principlesof English Usage in the DigitalAge). The term, "spamming," originated
from a comedy performance by "Monty Python's Flying Circus," an English comedy theatrical group. See Paul McAfee, New Media "Spams" Causing Indigestion Among E-Mail
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consider spamming "wrongful" conduct because the excessive data that
comprise the e-mail messages slow or disrupt the computer servers
processing Internet data transfers, resulting in a possible loss of service
to the user.18 Furthermore, the excessive quantities of e-mail generated
by spammers causes both Internet users and service providers alike to
incur unwanted expenses. Recipients of these unsolicited e-mail advertisements must pay the service provider for any on-line time required to
retrieve or delete these messages 19 while the service provider must expend valuable computer storage area by holding the recipients' unre20
trieved messages.
Spamming is one of the most intrusive advertising methods currently existing on the Internet. An attorney for Internet projects at the
Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C. estimated
that he receives between thirty and forty spamming complaints per
day. 2 1 "Spams are just about the number one complaint [that] we get
here with regard to the Internet."22 Unfortunately, no laws currently
exist that prohibit a spammer from engaging in this unscrupulous act. 23
Users, Bus. PREss, Nov. 18, 1996, at 11. In the comedy performance, a patron orders food
at a restaurant, repeating the word "Spain" to the point of absurdity. Id. The patron states
"I'm having Spain, Spain, Spain, Spare, Spain, Spare, Spain, baked beans, Spain, Spain and
Spain!" Id. The receipt of "Spain" e-mail requires an Internet e-mail addressee to repeatedly open and cancel unsolicited advertisement e-mail messages to the point of absurdity.
Id.
18. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (stating that Cyber Promotions' practice of sending unsolicited e-mail significantly
disrupted America Online's e-mail system where Cyber Promotions sent as many as
1,900,000 messages per day to America Online subscribers). Note, however, that despite
these problems, some Internet users support this method of advertising. See Pelline, supra
note 2 ("Of course, not everybody hates receiving junk email .... Some people find it useful,
and companies involved in the practice defend their legal right to communicate with wouldbe customers, just as with regular mail.").
19. Shelley Reese, The E-mail Posse, Mwm. TooLs, Sept. 1, 1996, at 1.
20. Loundy, supra note 16, at 6.
21. Tom Petruno, Net Surfers, be Aware of 'Spam" Wipeouts, Cm. SuN-Tlms, Oct. 22,
1996, at 42. One can attribute the growth to the fact that advertising, through the transmission of unsolicited e-mail, provides a low-cost and rapid method to reach millions of
people, worldwide. Id. Small companies use e-mail advertising as a way to compete with
wealthy corporations that can afford more expensive promotional campaigns. Id. For example, Mr. Petruno describes a small biomedical company which uses e-mail advertisements as a promotional medium to reach potential investors because such advertising
methods are economical. See Janet Kornblum, Spare King Challenged (visited Mar. 7,
1997) <http'/www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,5967,00.html> ("Some argue that junk mail is
the only way small businesses can compete with wealthy corporations that can afford elaborate Web sites and expensive publicity campaigns to promote them.").
22. Petruno, supra note 21, at 42 (statement of John Stark, counsel for Internet
Projects at the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington D.C.).
23. See Loundy, supra note 16, at 6 (stating that spainming is only a breach of Internet
etiquette and not currently illegal); McAfee, supra note 17, at 11. However, several states
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Instead, only Internet self-governing principles are available that allow
an Internet user to prevent the receipt of unsolicited advertisement email messages or that deter a spammer from initially sending the
24
messages.
Because of the foregoing, this Comment asserts that enforcement
mechanisms of self-imposed Internet regulations, although well intended, may violate existing statutes or common law regulations, thus
requiring state or federal governmental intervention. Part II of this
Comment illustrates the development of the present, decentralized Internet structure and then introduces the "Gate Keeper" method of self
governance, applied to the Internet through the use of self-imposed, voluntary standards. Furthermore, Part II introduces the boycott, the enforcement mechanism that Internet users and service providers
currently utilize to enforce these self-imposed, voluntary Internet standards. Next, Part II introduces antitrust law, the doctrine under which
liability may arise for those Internet users or service providers who aphave introduced, but not yet enacted, legislation to combat unsolicited electronic mail. See,
e.g., H.R. 1284, 61st Leg., 1st Sess. (Colo. 1997) (requiring e-mail solicitation to include a
return address to enable the recipient to request that e-mail sender deliver no further
transmissions); see also Brown & Raysman, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing proposed legislation introduced by the states of Connecticut and Nevada and noting their similarity to
federal statutes existing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that prohibits the transmission of unsolicited advertisement via facsimile); Courtney Macavinta,
Nevadans Against Spain (visited Mar. 9, 1997) <http'/www.news.com/News/Item/
0,4,7194,00.html> (discussing the scope of a bill introduced by state Republican majority
leader William Raggio that prohibits the transmission of unsolicited e-mail advertisements
for the sale of real property, goods or services).
24. For example, some Internet users created World Wide Web sites offering instructions on how to deal with the receipt of unsolicited e-mail. Pelline, supra note 2. Such sites
may instruct a user to notify his Internet service provider of his receipt of unsolicited advertisement e-mail. Id. The Web site may also suggest that a user copy the unsolicited email and return it to the sender. Id. Other Internet users have compiled "blacklists" of
"junk" e-mailers and published their e-mail addresses for others to copy for the purpose of
sending return junk mail. Id. Internet users may also utilize e-mail software that "filters"
incoming e-mail transmission for unsolicited e-mail advertisements. See Len Wagner,
Junk E-Mail: Despite Online Companies'Efforts,Junk E-Mail will Proliferate,Va. Pnor &
LEDGER STAR, Nov. 8, 1996, at D1 (discussing an e-mail filtering software, "Eudora," that

blocks the entry of unsolicited advertisement e-mail); see also Janet Kornblum, ISP: Internet Spam Provider (visited Feb. 19, 1997) <http'/www.news.com/News/Item/
0,4,8061,00.html> (discussing "Deadbolt" e-mail software that "filters out" e-mail possessing the domain name or IP address of a known Internet unsolicited e-mail sender). Finally,
Internet users may keep two or more e-mail accounts with their Internet service provider.
See Coates, supra note 16, at 1. Thus, the user can publicly use one e-mail box and fervently guard the other, disclosing the guarded address only to close friends, family members and important business contacts. Id. If the public e-mail box becomes inundated with
unsolicited advertisement e-mail, a user can continue to use the guarded e-mail account.
Id.
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ply this boycott enforcement mechanism towards others not following
their standards.
Part III illustrates an application by Internet users and service
providers of the boycott enforcement mechanism towards those parties
(spammers) who violate voluntary Internet standards by sending unsolicited, advertisement e-mail messages. Part III continues with an analysis of existing case law that finds the occurrence of antitrust violations
by parties applying boycott enforcement mechanisms towards others not
following their voluntary standards. Part III then uses a similar analysis to illustrate potential violations of antitrust law by Internet users
and service providers who enforce voluntary, self-imposed Internet standards by applying the boycott enforcement mechanism towards spammers. Finally, Part III proposes practices that companies can follow to
avoid antitrust violations. Part IV of this Comment then concludes with
an assertion that an increase in Internet antitrust actions, brought
about by increased on-line commercialism and the careless enforcement
of self-imposed, voluntary standards, will result in the promulgation of
governmental Internet regulations replacing such voluntary standards,
thus effectively limiting Internet self-governing principles.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE DECENTRALIZED INTERNET STRUCTURE AND INTERNET

SELF-GOvERNANCE

The Internet is a decentralized

25

global medium of communication

25. The Internet evolved from a computer communications

network originally

designed by the United States military in the 1960's to survive an enemy nuclear attack.
KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLm LAW xvi (1996); see Colin McRae, The Internet: A

Timeline - the Events Leading to the Passageof the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 (visited
Jan. 24, 1996) <httpi/faraday.clas.virginia.edu/-lcm8d/usem.htm>. During the cold war,

the United States and its allies envisioned a military command and control network that
existed between the numerous military bases located within various cities and countries.
McRae, supra. Having no central control point for communist enemies to target, communications between the allies would survive a nuclear attack through the near infinite number
of communication routes that existed between the allied bases. Id. In 1969, under commission of the Department of Defense, the Advanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA") developed an experimental network exhibiting the decentralized characteristics envisioned by
the United States and its allies. STUCKEY, supra, at xvi. This-experimental network,
"ARPANET," for ARPA-network, consisted of multiple, linked "nodes" or computers. McRae, supra. Each network possessed "the ability to originate, pass, and retrieve messages."
Id. If a given computer within the network was destroyed in a nuclear attack, other computers within the network could continue to communicate with one another. Id.
ARPANET became available for academic use between the years 1979-81. STUCKEY, supra,
at xvi. Military influence withdrew from ARPANET and consequently changed ARPANET
into its own multi-network system. McRae, supra. A "network of networks" steadily
evolved, expanding to accommodate increased commercial activity. STUCKEY, supra, at xvi;
McRae, supra.
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that, through the use of interactive Web 26 sites, links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world.2 7 Internet operation exists and functions through hundreds of thousands of separate
operators of computers and computer networks that communicate
through common data transfer protocols. 28 Because of the great number
of computer and computer networks existing on the Internet, no single
entity, be it academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit, presently
administers its use. 2 9 Instead, Internet administration or control takes
place at numerous locations, typically at points of Internet access to
users or by virtue of the working relationship existing between Internet
system operators. 30 This decentralized administration of the Internet
forms the foundation for the promulgation and enforcement of self-imposed Internet rules and regulations.

26. In 1994, hypertext markup language ("HTML") emerged, allowing further decentralization through the development of the World Wide Web ("Web"). See STUCKEY, supra
note 25, at xvi. Numerous host computers (servers) comprise the Internet and communicate with one another using hypertext transfer protocol language ("HTIT"). Id. Upon connecting to one of these servers or "Web sites," an Internet user will view a graphical page
that includes highlighted text (hypertext markup). Id. If the user points and clicks on the
highlighted text with the mouse, information from another Web site will appear. Id. The
information from the other Web site includes hypertext links to other web sites. Id. The
user can therefore browse or "surf" through numerous Web sites. Id.
27. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830 n.4; see David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet:
An Essay on Lawmaking in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLn;E L. art. 3, 913 (visited Jan. 24,
1997) <http://www.cli.org/DPost/X0023_ANARCHY.html> ("[The Internet] can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communication networks, e.g., individual BBS systems, Prodigy, the Georgetown University LAN, the
'Cyberia' discussion list, or the network of machines that can communicate across the
World Wide Web.").
28. The introduction of standardized network language protocols occurred in 1982.
STucKEY, supra note 25, at xvi. Known as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
("TCP/IP"), the language allowed for standardized communication between network computers. McRae, supra note 25; STucKEY, supra note 25, at xvi. TCP converts messages at
the source computer into "packet streams" and then reconverts them into messages again
when these "packet streams" reach the destination computer. McRae, supra note 25. IP
identifies the addresses of the source and destination computers involved in the data delivery. Id. The TCP/IP communication standard allowed for interconnectivity between individual networks, laying the groundwork for further decentralization and Internet growth.
STucKEy, supra note 25, at xvi.
29. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832 n.11.
30. See Sharon Eisner Gillett, The Self-Governing Internet: Coordination by Design
(visited Jan. 24, 1997) <http./ccs.mit.edu/CCSWP197.html>; David R. Johnson, Lawmaking and Law Enforcement in Cyberspace (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <httpJ/www.cli.org/DRJ/
make.html>; David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <http'./www.cli.org/X0025_LBFIN.html>.
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1. Internet Use and the Gate Keeper Theory of Self Governance: A
DecentralizedFoundationfor Internet Rule Enforcement
Before a person can use the Internet, that person must first gain
access. 31 Internet access typically requires a computer, modem,3 2 and
an Internet service provider. 33 Internet service providers ("ISPs") are
typically companies or organizations that offer telephone dial-up or other
moderate bandwidth3 4 connections to facilitate connecting individual
users to the Internet. 3 5 ISPs require consideration from a user in ex36
change for the granting of access before an ISP allows a user on-line.
Therefore, a contract exists at the core of every relationship between an
ISP and user.3 7 The basis for an Internet access contract is quite simple.
38
A service provider promises to provide the user access to the Internet.
In exchange, the user agrees to pay for the access provided and to follow
system rules established by the ISP (for example, do not harm other
39
users; do not disrupt the network servers).
31. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., How to Connect to the Internet,443 PLI/PAT 35,
37-38 (1996) [hereinafter Perritt, Connect to the Internet](discussing how either an individual computer user or a company local area network must access the Internet through a
subscription with an Internet service provider).
32. See PETER BROWN ET AL., MULTIMEDIA LAW: FoRMs & ANALYsis app. E (1996)
[hereinafter MULTIMEDIA LAW]; HENRY H. PERRrT JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 7 (1996) [hereinafter INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY]. Modems convert digital data

to analog data and vice versa before transmission of the data between digital and analog
equipment. MULTnIEDIA LAW, supra app. E; INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, supra, at 7.

Modems convert data before transfer between computing systems and analog telephone
networks. MULTIMEDIA LAW, supra, app. E; INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, supra, at 7.
33. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832 n.12; Perritt, Connect to the Internet, supra note 31 at 37.
34. INFORMATION

SUPERHIGHWAY,

supra note 32, at 5,7.

Bandwidth is the possible rate of information transferred through a communications channel. It thus measures capacity of a network and is usually expressed in
kilo (thousands) of bits per second (kbps), or mega (millions) of bits per second
(mbps). For example, a 100 megabit per second... [network] has ten times more
information transfer capacity than a 10 megabit per second ...

[network] ....

Dial-up connections are similar to those used in ordinary voice telephone communication. The originator of a communication session establishes a connection by
dialing the number of another station. Computers, working through modems, do
exactly the same thing, using exactly the same dial tones, to establish connections
with other computer systems.
Id. at 7.
35. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 833 n.18; see also MULTMVEDIA LAW, supra note 32, app.
E; Perritt, Connect to the Internet, supra note 31, at 37. With the establishment of many
new ISPs occurring every month, competition between ISPs is intense. Perritt, Connect to
the Internet, supra note 31, at 37. Some ISPs provide connection services to individual
computer users while others like MCI, AT&T, PSI and UUNet provide high bandwidth
connections to company networks. Id.
36. See RosE, supra note 16, at 39-40.
37. Id. at 39.
38. Id. at 40.

39. Id. at 39-40.
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Similarly, before an ISP can grant Internet access to contracted
users, the ISP must first purchase bandwidth from an Internet
bandwidth provider ("bandwidth provider"). 40 Like the relationship between the ISP and the user, a contractual agreement exists between the
bandwidth provider and the ISP that includes system rules that an ISP
must follow. 4 1 Again, these rules dictate the "do's and don'ts" of an ISP's

use of the Internet (for example,42abide by prohibition against using the
Internet for child pornography).
To ensure conformity with these rules, an ISP or bandwidth provider
agreement sets forth a means of rule enforcement. Regarding Internet
or bandwidth access, enforcement for non-conformance usually consists
of a relinquishment of Internet or bandwidth access. 43 An ISP denies
Internet access to a user while a bandwidth provider denies bandwidth
to an ISP, each for failing to follow a set of rules. Because ISPs and
bandwidth providers alike promulgate and enforce conduct rules for Internet or bandwidth use, each plays the role of a "gatekeeper," preventing system access by non-conformists. 44
Finally, these enforcement principles, although not resulting from
an express agreement, may exist between each of the various ISPs ex40. See INFORMATION

SUPERHIGHWAY,

supra note 32, at 35-36 (explaining the relation-

ships that exist between a provider of Internet bandwidth and a provider of Internet services); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Basic Technological Terms and Concepts, 443 PLI/PAT 23, 28
(1996) [hereinafter Perritt, Terms and Concepts]; see also DIGEX to Supply Internet Connectivity to Southwestern Bell, RBOC UPDATE, Nov. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5804301
(discussing bandwidth lease agreement between bandwidth provider and Internet service
provider); John Evan Frook, ISPs Take Niche Approach to Marketing, Comm. WK., Oct. 14,
1996, available in 1996 WL 12486393 (explaining that large companies may purchase
bandwidth directly instead of through Internet service providers, who buy it wholesale);
Bob Metcalfe, Beware of Fraud: Today's Internet Telephony Isn't Really Free or Reliable,
INFOWORLD, July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10765235 (explaining how Internet ser-

vice providers, through agreement, can receive Internet bandwidth in a given direction,
distance or quantity required for the application of Internet telephony).
41. The relationship that exists between an Internet bandwidth provider and service
provider falls within the same classification as the relationship that exists between the
Internet service provider and user; the "vertical" provider/consumer relationship. See INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, supra note 32, at 35-36. Some authorities classify bandwidth

and service providers under the rubric of "system operator." See, e.g., Johnson, supra note
30. Thus, system operator contracts often set forth the obligations that exist between
bandwidth and service providers. See RosE, supra note 16, at 42-43.
42. RosE, supra note 16, at 42-43.
43. Johnson, supra note 30 (discussing how a system operator can enforce Internet
access and use rules by banishing those users that break them); Johnson & Post, supra
note 30 ("System operators (sysops) have an extremely powerful enforcement tool at their
disposal to enforce rules - banishment.").
44. See Gillett, supra note 30 (discussing how an Internet service provider acts as a
'gatekeeper" by deciding which users will receive Internet access privileges); Johnson &
Post, supra note 30 (discussing how a system operator governs the access and use of a given
network).
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isting on the Internet. 4 5 For example, ISPs may agree to provide some
minimal level of privacy protection for e-mail messages transmitted between themselves. 4 6 To enforce this rule, ISPs may agree to exclude any
user who deliberately acts to defeat such protection. 4 7 Similarly, ISPs
may use exclusionary enforcement principles to limit the exchange of email traffic to only those ISPs that honor certain minimum standards.
These standards may, for example, pertain to accurate labeling of
message contents to ensure that users receive a specific type of
48
message.
The foregoing relationships all promulgate and enforce a given set of
guidelines regulating Internet use. However, a unilateral proclamation
of rules for a particular relationship does not work without conformity by
other parties to the same relationship.4 9 Whether a relationship exists
between two ISPs, between ISPs and bandwidth providers, or between
ISPs and users, all parties must agree to a common set of rules or regulations. 50 Realizing the need for a common set of standardized rules and
enforcement strategies, Internet service providers, bandwidth providers,
and users alike have created associations for the purpose of promulgating standardized Internet rules for members to follow.
2.

StandardizedInternet Regulations Created by Trade Associations
and Establishedas a Source of Antitrust Liability

A standard is a constant, uniform, or invariable means, method, or
tool adopted by a group for use in an industry to reach a specified goal. 51
Modern technology, consumer convenience, and considerations of efficiency and economy are the impetus for adopting industry-wide stan45. See Johnson, supra note 30.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. To facilitate the establishment of such rules, one commentator proposed the
following procedure:
(1) Any new proposed rule would be published in an easily accessible place and
distributed by mail to a list of system operators ("sysops") and others interested in
reviewing such proposals; (2) All comments and debate would be collected in the
same location and distributed to interested parties; (3) Sysops prepared to accept
and enforce the rule would register their agreement at this location; (4) Vigorous
opposition to particular rules, coupled with an indication of unwillingness to connect to systems that adopt the proposed rule, would be registered; (5) After a suitable interval, the sysops who agree upon the rule would proceed to implement and
enforce it.

Id.
51.

GEORGE

P.

LAMiB

& CARRINGTON

SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAw AND PRACTICE

76 (1971); cf. DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRY WIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 8 (1975)
(defining standard as "something taken for a basis of comparison, or that which is accepted
for current use through authority, custom or general consent....").
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dards and implementing certification programs. 52 An implementation of
standards allows for the achievement of many objectives. 5 3 With regard
to the Internet, an implementation of standards allow for the establishment of uniform rules for Internet operation and on-line conduct.5 4 The
purpose of such rules of conduct is the elimination of abusive business
practices, the reduction of injurious competition, the implementation of
of the status or imethical considerations, and the overall improvement
55
age of the trade, profession or industry.
The creation 5 6 and implementation of standards typically 5 7 result
from the actions of private, standard-setting trade and professional associations. 58 Individuals and companies interested in furthering their
common commercial and professional goals join forces and form trade
and professional associations. 5 9 Trade associations exist "to provide
[their] members with tools, usually in the form of information, that will
52. Tedd Blecher, Product Standards and CertificationPrograms,46 BROOK L. REV.
223, 223 (1980).
53. LAMB & SHIELDS, supra note 51, at 76. A standard may establish dimensional or
quality guidelines in the design and manufacture of goods. Id. at 77. A standard may
outline procedures and goals for the quality and performance testing of goods and materials. Id. Standards may also establish rules and instruction for the use of a given good or
service. Id.
54. See Johnson, supra note 30.
55. Blecher, supra note 52, at 229.
56. Companies and product users within a given industry promulgate both suggestions
for new standards and revisions of existing standards. LAMB & SHIELDS, supra note 51, at
77-78. Engineers, scientists, and other specialists employed by the member companies
draft the standards for trade association programs. Id. at 77. Also, qualified trade association employees assist the member companies in drafting the standards. Id. Member company employees and trade association employees work together to determine the soundness
and feasibility of the newly drafted standards. Id. If the standard passes muster, the
member company or trade association may submit these standards to the American Standards Institute, the National Bureau of Standards, or other agency, for national recognition. Id. at 78.
57. In the United States, the federal government occasionally promulgates standards
for various industries. For example, the Federal Communications Commission sets standards for telephone network interconnections and product uses that may interfere with
broadcast communications. 47 C.F.R. § 68.1 (1990). See Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of
Non-governmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal StandardsAffecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1329, 1332 n.2 (1978); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards and Certification, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 471, 471 (1994).

58. See Gerla, supra note 57.
59. ROBERT H. MORSE & TIMOTHY J. WATERS, INTRODUCTION To ANTITRUST AND TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS: How TRADE REGULATION LAws APPLY To TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL AsSOCIATIONS 3 (Robert H. Morse & Timothy J. Waters eds., 1996). Thousands of trade and

professional associations exist in the United States. Id. These associations represent manufacturers, contractors, service providers and a variety of other occupations. Id. Typically,
these associations focus on conducting business efficiently, responsibly and legally. Id
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"60 By
enable them to operate more efficiently and more effectively ..
establishing trade associations for the Internet, the associations can implement standards that unify Internet regulations, thereby increasing
on-line communication efficiency.
The need for standardized Internet regulations has resulted in the
emergence of a proliferation of on-line trade associations, each intent on
bringing uniformity to Internet use. 6 1 Many of these new associations
are currently in the process of drafting standards for on-line commerce
and advertising. 62 For example, the creation of a non-profit association
called the Internet Local Advertising and Commerce Association
("ILAC") resulted in the promulgation of commerce and advertising standards intended for on-line buyers and sellers. 6 3 ILAC transforms the Internet into a valuable resource for advertisers and consumers by drafting
and promoting on-line commerce standards. 64 Many of the leading Internet companies serving the growing on-line advertising and commerce
market, including Microsoft Corp., Pacific Bell Interactive Media, GTE
Directories and R. H. Donnelley, attended an organizational meeting
65
held by ILAC.
Established associations are also drafting standards for on-line commerce and advertising activities. The Direct Marketing Association collaborated with the Internet Services Association to develop standards
promoting consumer privacy protection and to direct those marketers

60. LAMM & SHIELDS, supra note 51, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Jim Davis, Rules Issued for Online Privacy (visited Mar. 7, 1997) <http'J/
www.news.com/News/Item/O,4,1478,00.html> (announcing a set of guidelines regulating
on-line e-mail advertising); National Computer Security Association: General Information
(visited Feb. 15, 1997) <http'//www.ncsa.com/ncsabtl.html> (discussing the association's
mission to improve all aspects of world-wide digital security, reliability and ethics).
62. An Internet advertising association "dedicated to increasing the use and effectiveness of Internet advertising," joined an advertising and entertainment association to proclaim voluntary standards for Internet Web site advertising banners. JAB: Web Ad
Spending Up, Banner Standards Needed, MEDIA DAILY, Dec. 12, 1997, available in 1996
WL 14322870. Some Internet industries already adopted these standards. See Lycos Endorses Ad Standards, INTERAcTrVE DAILY, Mar. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7139930
(announcing that an Internet search engine software company adopted standards for Internet Web site banner advertisements possessing the endorsement of both an Internet
advertising association and an advertising and entertainment association); see also Overset: Interactive:Lycos Inc., MEDIA DAIY, Mar. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7729439.
63. News Briefs ... Microsoft and Vicinity, REP. ON MicRosorr, Mar. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8661516.
64. Id.
65. Id. See also Hotnews Business Briefs, INTERNET WK., Mar 10, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8527489 (discussing the proposed participation of nearly 200 Internet executives
in the organizational meeting of the Internet Local Advertising and Commerce Association
and how "the group intends to accelerate the development of standards and business practices to improve local Internet advertising ... [with] Microsoft Corp., Digital City, Times
Mirror Co., and R. H. Donnelley ... expected to attend").
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utilizing interactive, on-line media. 6 6 Furthermore, the Better Business
Bureau ("BBB") recently launched "BBBOnline," an on-line certification
program. 6 7 "Like the BBB's real world counterpart, BBBOnline will
award a seal of approval to companies that agree to abide by a set of
business practices ... [to include] participat[ion] in the BBB's [on-line]
advertising self regulation program." 68 Not unlike the creation of ILAC,
which drew industry-wide support, this project attracted large corporate
sponsors such as Netscape, Ameritech, GTE, and Eastman Kodak, all
hoping to bring standardized self-imposed regulation to the on-line
69
marketplace.
The creation of present standardization and certification programs
for the Internet remains largely in the hands of trade associations, who
may gain both financial support and substantive standardization ideas
from private Internet corporations and companies. However, executives
of private companies, who are also members of these trade associations,
may possess a "strong motive to suppress competition." 70 Thus, these
Internet companies, under the guise of an association promoting standardized Internet regulation, may promulgate and enforce Internet rules
designed to harm on-line competition. 7 1 Such questionable use of Internet rules and enforcement mechanisms therefore invokes the federal
antitrust laws.

72

66. Reese, supra note 19.
The principles advocate: posting on-line solicitations to news groups, bulletin
boards, and chat rooms only when consistent with a service provider's stated policies; clearly identifying on-line solicitations as such and disclosing the marketer's
identity-solicitations should contain an opt-out mechanism for consumers who do
not wish to be included on mailing lists that will be sold, rented, or exchanged with
other companies marketing on-line; individuals and companies harvesting information from on-line activities should give consumers the option of having their
names and e-mail suppressed; marketers who operate chat areas, news groups,
and other public forums should inform users that information they volunteer in
these areas may result in unsolicited messages from others.
Id.
67. Phone Companies Take Lead In Supporting On-Line Consumer Protection Drive,
Comm. DAILY, Aug. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2370413 [hereinafter Phone Companies]
(explaining how the Better Business Bureau launched BBBOnline Service to aid on-line
shoppers in the investigation of on-line fraudulent advertising practices); see Helft, supra
note 9; Paula Squires, Better Business Bureaus To Offer Approval of Web Sites, RIcHMoND
Tmms-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 1996, at El.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Helft, supra note 9, at D1.
Phone Companies, supra note 67.
Gerla, supra note 57, at 471.
Id.
Id.
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ANTITRUST LAW

To preserve the American system of competition, lawmakers created
United States antitrust laws by enacting the Sherman Act of 1890. The
Sherman Act ensures that unlawful agreements among competitors, customers, and suppliers do not inhibit competition among business enterprises.7 3 The Sherman Act, although comprised of seven sections,
contains only two sections relevant to trade associations and rule
standardization.

74

Section 1 of the Act prevents business practices that restrain
trade.7 5 Section 2 prevents business practices that result in trade and
industry monopolies. 76 "Although section 2 occasionally serves as the
basis of an antitrust action against an association, section 1 is far more
commonly cited both in antitrust complaints and in court opinions discussing alleged and proved antitrust violations by associations." 77 Section 1 is cited more often because trade association activities "by their
very nature, constitute a 'contract,' 'combination' or 'agreement',... one
73. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951); MORSE & WATERS, supra
note 59, at 1.
The Sherman Act, in part, was a reaction to "trusts" and "combinations" by companies seeking to find ways to maximize efficiency or eliminate market dislocations
through coordinated industry-wide conduct. The business combinations or trusts
of the late 19th century were viewed as artificial devices to control markets, restrict competition, and exploit the public. The sponsors of antitrust legislation,
however, were not hostile to new business arrangements, mere size, or market
power. Cooperative trade groups and chambers of commerce were a product, in
part, of the industrialization of America. Indeed, associations can trace their origins to the merchant guilds of medieval times. Rather, the purpose underlying the
Sherman Act was to "preserve the competitive process and to channel it along socially productive lines". In many respects, today's trade associations are an evolution of last century's trust and business.
Fortunately, the fear and suspicion about business combinations of the late
19th century has been dissipated, if not disabused. As we approach the 21st century, the courts and antitrust agencies fully recognize that trade and professional
associations perform a great number of functions that are useful and valuable, not
only to their members, but also to society generally. The self governing activities
of many associations serve to educate businesses and professionals, as such, advance the consumer welfare. The internationalization of the United States economy underscores the need for industries to harmonize and interface different
product standards and business practices with foreign trading partners. These
tasks are not well suited to individual corporate efforts. Collaboration and coordination among businesses is inevitable and increasingly essential. Nevertheless,
given the genesis of the Sherman Act, and its focus on collective activity, trade
associations have and will continue to have an inextricable relationship with the
antitrust laws.
Id. at 1-2 (citations omitted).
74. ARTHUR L. HEROLD & GEORGE D. WEBSTER, ANTrTRUST GUIDE FOR AsSOCIATION ExEcuTIVEs 2 (2d ed. 1979).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); HEROLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 2.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 2; HEROLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 2.
77.

HEROLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 2.
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of the [two] threshold elements [required for an antitrust violation
under] ... section 1 of the Sherman Act."78 The nature of the associa79
tion's activity resulting from the combination or agreement dictates
the second threshold element for a section 1 antitrust violation; whether
the conduct of any trade association creates an unreasonable restraint of
trade.8 0
1. Requirements for Findingan Antitrust Violation: Parallel Conduct
and Plus Factors
A violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraints of trade resulting from combinations and agreements, requires a
finding of "concerted action" between at least two separate parties or entities.8 1 Although evidence of a concerted action may exist in the form of
an express agreement,8 2 the courts also deduce the existence of an agree78. MORSE & WATERS, supra note 59, at 3.

79. Id.
80. "Restraint of trade" is a term of art derived from the common law. LAMB &
SHMLDS, supra note 51, at 21.

The courts originally applied the term to covenants under which one individual
agreed not to compete with another, usually for a limited time and within a limited territory. With time, the courts extended the term "in restraint of trade" to
test the legality of agreements among competitors to refrain from competing with
one another and to agreements restricting the ability of outsiders to conduct business. If a court found such an agreement to be 'in restraint of trade," the court
held that the agreement was illegal As trade associations may affect the legality
of these aforementioned agreements, "restraint of trade" thus became a test of the
legality of a trade association's activities.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (actions required by an
ordinance were unilateral and not 'concerted," as required by section 1 of the Sherman
Act); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) ([A]
plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of section 1 must present evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently."); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (alleged conspiracies between a
corporation and its employees and subsidiaries constituted a unilateral action not subject
to section 1 prohibition under the Sherman Act); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984) (finding no concerted action existed where individual complaints from
dealers caused the termination of a competitor; the action did not satisfy the concerted
requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
82. See, e.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (existence of
express concerted agreement of attorneys to not represent clients in court); FTC v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (existence of express agreement to refuse compliance
with an insurance request); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (existence of express agreements for the allocation of customers and territories); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (existence of express dealing agreement); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (existence of express agreement to
engage in group boycott); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (existence of express agreement to fix prices); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220
U.S. 373 (1911) (existence of express price fixing agreements).
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ment from circumstantial evidence.8 3
In early antitrust decisions, proof of "parallel" conduct by a group of
co-conspirators provided the requisite probative evidence to prove the
existence of an agreement between them.84 However, the courts now require "plus factors" as additional evidence to bolster the inference of col-

lusion through parallel conduct.8 5 For example, the courts use the
following factors to bolster the circumstantial proof of parallel conduct:
attendance of meetings by the defendants where defendants have an opportunity to conspire; hostile statements made by defendants; presence
of a motive for defendants to agree; behavior by defendants that extends

beyond that which is expected of them absent an agreement; behavior by
83. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,
612 (1914).
But it is said that in order to show a combination or conspiracy within the Sherman Act, some agreement must be shown under which the concerted action is
taken. It is elementary, however, that conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by
direct testimony, and may be inferred from the things actually done; and when, in
this case, by concerted action the names of wholesalers who were reported as having made sales to consumers were periodically reported to the other members of
the associations, the conspiracy to accomplish that which was the natural consequence of such action may be readily inferred.
Id. at 612. See also Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 96364 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (illustrating a situation where circumstantial evidence supported an inference of an agreement between a health care financing organization and a hospital's competitors).
84. Another phrase for such conduct is "conscious parallelism of action." LAMB &
SHIELDS, supra note 51, at 25. Conscious parallelism of action allows a court to infer a
conspiracy between two parties under section 1 of the Sherman Act from evidence showing
that the two "had access to the same information and reacted in a similar manner to the
information." Id. Early anti-trust court decisions used "conscious parallelism" as a sufficient basis for a finding of concerted actions between parties. See American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (finding that an agreement existed because of the presence of parallel pricing and competitive bidding behavior); Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (stating that concurrent acceptance of"invitations" to engage in
similar pricing behavior by a group of suppliers was sufficient to prove a concerted action
existed, where such acceptance was essential for implementing the pricing scheme); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F.2d 882-83 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds,
327 U.S. 251 (1946) ("Knowing participation by competitors without previous agreement in
a plan, the necessary consequence which is carried out is unlawful restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy."); William Golman Theatres,
Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 745 (3d. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948)
("Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business where each
is ware of the other's activities, the effect which is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the statutes before us.").
85. See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 54041 (1954) (stating that, parallel business behavior, although admissible to infer agreement
between two parties, is insufficient by itself to prove the occurrence of an antitrust violation); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that parallel pricing of an identical product within a given market is not sufficient by itself
to prove a violation of antitrust laws).
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defendants that is contrary to their economic self interest; and a simulta86
neous imposition by defendants of substantially identical terms of sale.
Therefore, if companies doing business on the Internet engage in parallel
conduct with any of these aforementioned "plus factors" present, their
activities may satisfy the requirement of a concerted action under section
1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Restraint of Trade: Enforcement of Standards Through Boycott and
the Per Se / Rule of Reason Dichotomy for FindingAntitrust
Violations
Effective governance of the Internet through self-regulation requires
more than merely promulgating various standards.8 7 Governance of the
Internet requires "actual enforcement of [these] standards through the
imposition of sanctions for noncompliance."88 Typically, sanctions exacted against violators of self-imposed Internet standards take the form
of "concerted refusals to deal."8 9 The courts have defined such concerted
86. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97
(1986) (discussing how the presence or absence of a motive is a factor to consider when
trying to determine whether the ambiguous conduct of the defendants constituted a con-

spiracy under antitrust laws); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.,
998 F.2d 1224, 1243-45 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that defendant's conduct of refraining from
bidding on accounts already serviced by other defendants was a factor to consider when
determining the presence of an antitrust violation because such conduct was contrary to
the defendant's economic self interest); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 826
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the defendant's conduct was a factor to consider in determining the occurrence of an antitrust violation where "each defendant engaging in the parallel
action [may have] acted contrary to its economic self interest.. . ."); Park v. El Paso Bd. of
Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059-61 (5th. Cir. 1985) (finding conspiracy where there are hostile comments combined with predatory economic coercion and refusals to deal); Penne v.
Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating
that lower court should not have granted summary judgment where evidence of conspiracy
included allegation of hostile comments, blacklisting, and punitive commission shares).
87. Peter M. Brody & Clark C. Havighurst, PrivateAccreditation In The Regulatory
States: Accrediting And The Sherman Act, 57 LAw & CoNT'mp. PROBS. 199, 212 (1994).
88. Id.
89. For example, a Web site exists on the Internet that advocates the boycott of on-line
advertisers. See Axel Boldt, Blacklist of Internet Advertisers (visited July 14, 1997) <http://
math-www.uni-paderborn.de/-axel/BLIblacklist.html> ("If you judge that one of the judged
[advertising] behaviors deserves some punishment, you could for example ... [b]oycott the
advertising business."). Thus, the administrator of this Web site recommends boycotting
companies that engage in on-line advertising. Id. ("[The Internet is probably as close to
anarch[y] as we can get .... Therefore, punishing of unwelcome [advertising] behavior
[through boycotting] should be done by private individuals following the same grassroots
philosophy that governs the rest of the Internet."). For an interesting article that discusses
this Web site, see Reese, supra note 19. See also Korublum, supra note 24 (discussing that
bandwidth providers will boycott Internet service providers that support bulk e-mail
advertising).
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refusals to deal as "group boycotts."90 Group boycotts refer to the activities a given party performs to pressure another party into acting a desired way when the given party withholds, or enlists others to withhold,
patronage or services from the other party. 91 Furthermore, the courts

have added judicial gloss by distinguishing between two altogether different categories of group boycotts; those so inherently anti-competitive
that the courts deem them as per se illegal, and those where anti-competitive behavior is justifiable under a rule of reason analysis. 9 2 Thus, a
pattern of Supreme Court decisions regarding the antitrust legality of
94
commercial boycotts 9 3 may aid in charting the presently unexplored

legal territories of the Internet.
a.

The Per Se Doctrine of Boycott Illegality

The doctrine of "per se boycott illegality" allows a plaintiff to prove
the occurrence of an anti-competitive action without extensive inquiry by
the court into the factual circumstances justifying the occurrence or a
90. See, e.g., Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (referring to "group boycotts" as "concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders"); cf
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801-02 (1993) (distinguishing a "concerted agreement to terms" from a "conditional boycott," by which companies collectively
use unrelated transactions as leverage to achieve desired terms for a specific transaction).
91. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1978).
92. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (distinguishing between per se illegality, which requires a showing of market power or service control, and rule of reason illegality, which does not require
such a showing).
Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always
likely to have an anti-competitive effect is not warranted. Absent such a showing
with respect to a cooperative buying arrangement, courts should apply a rule-ofreason analysis. At no time has [the plaintiff] made a threshold showing that the
structural characteristics are present in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Because the Supreme Court decided only a small number of antitrust cases regarding trade associations, legal precedent is limited in this area of law. MoRsE & WATERS,
supra note 59, at 7. Thus, trade associations must refer to outdated case law when seeking
legal guidance with regard to antitrust law. Id.
94. See STucIcY, supra note 25, at x-xi.
There is a growing need for specific laws to optimize the development of these new
[Internet] markets and to minimize risks and threats of harm. Such laws are
needed to identify efficiently and allocate risks, resolve disputes, enhance security
and privacy, and achieve certainty in commercial dealings that do not involve
traditional paper instruments and signatures. Laws are needed to establish
boundaries to acceptable conduct and accountability for exceeding them ....
At
present the amount of directly applicable law is relatively scant, with only "pockets" of law having been specifically addressed. The range of relevant legal issues is
extremely broad-reflecting the vast scope of potential on-line conduct and
communication.
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finding by the court of an actual occurrence of trade restraint. 95 The
doctrine evolved through a series of Supreme Court decisions, with each
consecutive decision giving per se illegality increased strength. In Fashion Originators'Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 96 (hereinafter "Fashion
Originators")clothing manufacturers, as members of The Fashion Originators' Guild of America ("FOGA"), boycotted clothing retailers who sold
garment "copies" made by manufacturers. 9 7 Although FOGA members
tried to justify their actions as an attempt to prevent an "unfair trade
practice" and "tortious invasion of their rights" resulting from the manufacture and sale of copied garments, the Supreme Court declared that
the FOGA boycott constituted both an "unfair method of competition"
98
and a Sherman Act offense.
In their decision, the Court noted that the FOGA boycott ran contrary to the Sherman Act by restraining general competition.9 9 The
95. See WALKER B. COMEGYS,

A GUIDE FOR COUNSEL,
(1986).
96. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
97. Id. at 461. Garment manufacturers, who claimed to create original and distinctive
garment designs for women, sought to curb "style piracy," a practice whereby other clothing
manufacturers merely copied these designs and sold them to the public at a lower price. Id.
ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE MANUAL:

MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC OFFICLALS 8

The manufacturers, as members of the Fashion Originator's Guild of America ("FOGA"),
sought, as a group, to eliminate competitors benefiting from the sale of copied garments by
"influencing" retailers not to sell them. Id. FOGA accomplished this objective by distributing to member clothing manufacturers the names of retailers selling the copied garments.
Id. The member manufacturers then refrained from selling their goods to retailers known
to sell garment copies. Id. As a result of their efforts, thousands of clothing retailers
throughout the country signed agreements to not sell copied garments. Id. Of these retailers, more than half agreed to FOGA's demands only because they did not want clothing
manufacturers to refuse to sell their garments. Id. at 461-62.
98. Id. at 464-65.
If the purpose and practice of the combination of garment manufacturers and their
affiliates runs counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, the Federal Trade Commission has the power to suppress it as an unfair
method of competition. From its findings the Commission concluded that the
[FOGA members], "pursuant to understandings, arrangements, agreements, combinations and conspiracies entered into jointly and severally," had prevented sales
in interstate commerce, had "substantially lessened, hindered and suppressed"
competition, and had tended "to create in themselves a monopoly."... We hold
that the Commission, upon adequate and unchallenged findings, correctly concluded that this practice constituted an unfair method of competition.
Id.
99. Id. at 465.
[T]he many respects in which FOGA's plan runs contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act are these: it narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufactures can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy; subjects all retailers
and manufacturers who decline to comply with the FOGA's program to an organized boycott; takes away the freedom of action of members by requiring each to
reveal to the FOGA the intimate details of their individual affairs; and has both as
its necessary tendency and as its purpose the effect of direct suppression of competition from the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs.
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Court further averred that the manufacturers, who claimed that their
actions "were reasonable and necessary to protect the manufacturer, laborer, retailer and consumer against the devastating evils growing from
the pirating of [their] original designs," had no justifiable reason to engage in a boycott.1 00 The Court stated: "[A]s we have pointed out... the
aim of [the manufacturers] was the intentional destruction of one type of
manufacture and sale which competed with Guild members."' 0 ' "The
purpose and object of [the boycott], its potential power,.., the coercion it
could and did practice upon a rival method of competition, all brought it
within the policy and prohibition declared by the Sherman ... Act." i0 2
Finally, the Court admonished FOGA for, in effect, creating an extragovernmental agency that proscribed the regulations of antitrust law.10 3
In a second case, the Supreme Court again applied a strict per se
approach to determine that a boycott by appliance manufacturers violated the Sherman Act. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-HaleStores, Inc.,'10 4
(hereinafter "Klor's") a San Francisco appliance store brought an antitrust action against a competitor, alleging that the larger competitor
threatened appliance manufacturers by refusing to buy from them if
they also sold appliances to Klor's. 1° 5 The Court, in reversing the appellate court decision 10 6 and remanding the case to the district court, held
that the boycott against Klor's constituted a combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, despite the fact
that Klor's offered no evidence supporting a negative affect on
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 467.
101. FashionOriginators,312 U.S. at 467.
102. Id. at 467-68.
103. Id. at 465 ("[T]he [boycotting party] is in reality an extra-governmental agency,
which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violation, and thus
'trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute.'").
104. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
105. Id. at 208-09. The manufacturers included "such well-known brands as General
Electric, RCA, Admiral, Zenith [and] Emerson...." Id. at 209.
106. Id. at 214. In district court, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 209. In support of its
motion, the defendants submitted affidavits showing the existence of other appliance retailers in the same geographic region as Klor's, who, although also in competition with the
defendant, sold many of the competing brands of appliances allegedly not supplied to Kor's
because of the defendant's influence. Id. at 209-10. The district court thus dismissed the
complaint and entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that the controversy between Klor's and Broadway-Hale did not violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 210. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a summary
judgment, holding that the competitive activities of the defendant did not harm the public
good, as proscribed by antitrust laws, because they had no effect on the quality or quantity
of goods offered for sale. Id.

1997]

DOWNFALL OF INTERNET SELF GOVERNANCE

145

competition. 107
The Court justified its per se holding that the boycott violated the
Sherman Act by stressing the wrongful conduct incurred by Kor's. "The
[appellate court] holding, if correct, means that unless the opportunities
for customers to buy in a competitive market are reduced, a group of
powerful businessmen may act in concert to deprive a single merchant,
like Klor's, of the goods he needs to compete effectively." l0 8 "This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer
of... products." 10 9 "As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the
victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that its destruction makes little difference [to] the economy." 10 Therefore, in addition
to giving no consideration to reasons of justification in finding a given
party's boycott in violation of the Sherman Act, as in Fashion Originators, the Supreme Court found the boycott action in violation of the Sherman Act without proof that the action actually constituted a restraint on
competition. The culmination of the per se doctrine of boycott illegality,
however, came with the 1963 Supreme Court decision of Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange (hereinafter "Silver")."'
In Silver, the Court held that the stock exchange's action of withdrawing the telephone wire connections that enabled Silver to trade securities 1 2 constituted a boycott and per se violation of the Sherman
Act. 113 After a minimal analysis of trade restraint and a brief emphasis
on the wrong incurred by the plaintiff,114 the Court held that the boycott
activity of the exchange constituted an antitrust violation because no ex107. Id. at 210. In support of its decision, the court stated that boycotts breach anti-

trust laws because they constitute a class of restraint that is "unduly restrictive," of commerce. Id. at 211.
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have
long been held to be in the forbidden category [of restraint]. They have not been
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor
by a failure to show that they "fixed or regulated prices, parceled out or limited
production, or brought about a deterioration in quality."
Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 210.
109. Id. at 213.
110. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213.
111. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
112. Id. at 343. Since there was no central trading place for securities traded over the
counter, the wire connections enabled Silver to trade securities with numerous firms
through out the country. Id. at 348. The wire connections also enabled Silver to obtain
market information to aid in the decision of whether to buy or sell securities. Id.
113. Id. at 347 ("The concerted action of the exchange and its members here was, in
simple terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of a valuable business service which
they needed to compete effectively as broker/dealers in the over-the-counter securities
market.").
114. Id. at 348.
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isting statute justified this activity. 1 15 Also, as in Fashion Originators,
the Court again admonished the exchange for engaging in activities that
were extra-governmental. 116 Thus, Silver strengthened the per se doctrine by allowing for a finding of illegality under the Sherman Act for any
boycott deriving no justification from existing statutes. However, many
1 17
lower courts were critical of the sweeping rule set forth by Silver,
eventually leading to a modification of the per se doctrine and the introduction of the "rule of reason" analysis.
b.

The Rule of Reason Doctrine of Boycott Illegality

After Silver, the Supreme Court withdrew from a sweeping application of the per se doctrine for commercial boycotts and instead applied a
"doctrine of reasonableness" to determine antitrust liability. 118 The doctrine of reasonableness "enables the courts to avoid an all-encompassing
literal application of the Sherman Act while permitting the courts to give
substance to its broad language, thereby saving the statute from attack
on the grounds of vagueness."' 19 For example, in Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & PrintingCo., (hereinafter "Northwest Wholesale") the Supreme Court limited the per se illegality applied
in Fashion Originatorsto boycotts that caused a restraint of trade while
0
simultaneously providing no commercial benefit.12
In Northwest Wholesale, the expelled member of a purchasing cooperative brought suit, alleging the expulsion constituted a group boycott
115. Id. at 348-49.
116. Id. at 348. See id. at 357 (explaining that the courts do not exempt self-regulatory
conduct from antitrust laws or other statutes and that the courts do not favor any actions
repealing governmental laws).
117. See, e.g., Phil Tolkan Datsun v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Adver. Ass'n,
672 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (ignoring the Silver per se standard); United States
Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Down Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that a
growing number of courts recognize that an application of the Silver per se standard is
improper).
118. See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
Congress... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history
makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition .... Contrary to its name,
the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of the reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.
Id. at 688.
119. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
120. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing Co. 472
U.S. 284, 290 (1985); see Gerla, supra note 57, at 498-99 (discussing the Fashion Originators per se standard of boycott liability and how Northwest Wholesale reduced the Fashion
Originators).
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in per se violation of the Sherman Act. 1 2 1 The Supreme Court, in upholding a summary judgment granted to the cooperative by the district
22
court, 1 cited Klor's and Silver as boycott cases deserving of per se invalidation under the Sherman Act.1 23 The Court justified a per se finding
in these cases possessed a "dominant
only because the boycotting parties
12 4
position" in the relevant market.
According to this rationale, the Court, in effect, modified the per se
rule for boycotts to include ingredients of reasonableness. 1 25 Thus, according to the reasonableness inquiry of Northwest Wholesale, "[ulnless
the [boycotting party] possesses market power or exclusive access to an
element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that [boycott] is
virtually always likely to have an anti-competitive effect is not
26
warranted."
The Supreme Court again applied the rule of reason standard of
Northwest Wholesale in FTC v. IndianaFederationof Dentists12 7 (hereinafter "IndianaFederation")when dentists, fearing encroachment on
their professional independence and economic well being, formed a federation to resist an insurer's request for x-rays for benefit payment evaluation. 128 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision of the Seventh
121. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 288. A purchasing cooperative expelled one of its
members, Pacific, a seller of both retail and wholesale office supplies, after Pacific failed to
notify the cooperative that the Pacific's sales operations changed owners. Id. at 287. Prior
to the ownership change of Pacific, the cooperative amended its bylaws to prohibit members from engaging in both retail and wholesale operations. Id. Although Pacific engaged
in both retail and wholesale operations, a grandfather clause preserved Pacific's membership rights. Id. Pacific's new owners did not officially inform the cooperative of this
change. Id. Pacific's failure to notify the cooperative violated the cooperative's bylaws. Id.
Later, the cooperative's directors voted to expel Pacific. Id. However, the issue of whether
the cooperative expelled Pacific for failing to notify the cooperative of Pacific's new owners
or whether the cooperative expelled Pacific because Pacific engaged in both retail and
wholesale operations remained in dispute. Id.
122. Id. at 288. The district court rejected application of the per se standard, and instead applied a rule of reason analysis to find no occurrence of anti-competitiveness, thus
granting summary judgment to the cooperative. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the uncontroverted facts of the case supported a finding of
per se liability. Id.
123. Id. at 293.
124. Id. at 294.
125. Although per se illegality does not ordinarily involve a factual evaluation of facts or
circumstances surrounding a commercial wrong, the Court nonetheless described their factual finding of an antitrust violation as a per se analysis instead of one involving a rule of
reason analysis. See id. at 296.
126. Id. at 285. Absent such a showing with respect to a cooperative buying arrangement, courts should apply a rule of reason analysis. Id.
127. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
128. Id. at 451. Dental health insurers, in an effort to contain the cost of dental treatment, requested that dentists submit x-rays with their claim forms so that the insurers
could review a dentist's evaluation and diagnosis before paying insurance claims. Id. at
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Circuit Court of Appeals that vacated a Federal Trade Commission cease
and desist order 129 against the Federation of Dentists, used a "rule of
reason" standard to determine that the Federation's conduct constituted
a concerted refusal to deal.130 Although the Court noted past decisions
holding boycotts as unlawful per se, it nonetheless "decline[d] to resolve
[the] case by forcing the Federation's policy into the 'boycott' pigeonhole
13 1
and invoking the per se rule."

The Court found the dentists' boycott in violation of the Sherman
Act because, under a rule-of-reason analysis of the boycott's purpose and
effect, the boycott impaired the provision of price-competitive dental care
to consumers.13 2 Hence, unlike the per se holdings of Fashion Originators, Klor's, and Silver, Northwest Wholesale and Indiana Federationrequire a finding of anti-competitive affect on a given market before a court
can find a party liable for boycott actions under the Sherman Act.
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court deviated from the holdings of
Northwest Wholesale and Indiana Federation by rejecting this narrow
application of the per se rule in a later decision.
449. After the insurance company receives the claim forms and accompanying x-rays from
a given dentist, the insurance company forwards the materials to claim examiners, who,
after reviewing them, may approve the payment of claims. Id. If the claim examiners determine that the treatment recommended by the dentist is possibly unnecessary, they refer
the claims to a dental consultant, typically a licensed dentist, who then further reviews the
materials. Id. After this further review, the dental consultant may recommend that the
insurer either approve or deny a claim. Id. at 449. The consultant may also recommend
that the insurer seek a less expensive treatment. Id. Concerned about their economic livelihood, the dentists initially resisted as part of a state dental association. Id. at 449-50.
However, after the association consented to a Federal Trade Commission order requiring it
to cease and desist from further efforts to resist sending x-rays, dentists formed a separate
federation to continue their boycotting efforts. Id. at 450-51.
129. Before an administrative law judge, the FTC concluded that the federation's x-ray
boycott policy constituted a restraint of trade because the boycott prohibited competition
between dentists with respect to the use of their insurance policies. Id. at 451-52. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission erred in finding that the
boycott violated the Sherman Act because "the evidence did not support the finding that, in
the absence of restraint, dentists would compete for patients by offering cooperation with
the requests of the patient's insurers .... " Id. at 453. The Seventh Circuit also faulted the
Commission "for not finding that the alleged restraint on competition had actually resulted
in higher dental costs to patients and insurers." Id.
130. Id. at 458.
131. Id. The Court referred to Northwest Wholesale in explaining that "the category of
restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately" and that the
Court has "been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se ....
" Id.
132. Indiana Federation,476 U.S. at 459. The Court stated that the boycott "impair[ed]
the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired
goods to consumers at a price approximating the marginal [insurer's] cost of providing
them." Id.
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Coming Around Full Circle:A Return to the Per Se Doctrine of
Boycott Illegality

In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n (hereinafter "SCTLA"), 133 a group of private attorneys agreed not to represent destitute
34
criminal defendants until they received an increase in compensation. 1
In reviewing the appellate court's ruling that vacated an FTC cease-anddesist order barring the attorneys' boycott, the Supreme Court used the
per se test to uphold the FTC's prohibition.135 The Court held that the
lawyers' boycott "constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act." 136 Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the appellate court's assumption that the per se standard "is
only a rule of administrative convenience and efficiency, not a statutory
command." 13 7 Rather, the Court stated that "[t]he per se rules
are .

.

.

the product of judicial interpretations

of the Sherman

Act... [that] nevertheless have the same force and effect as other statutory commands."'

38

Therefore, as SCTLA demonstrates, the Supreme Court may continue to apply the per se doctrine when deciding the antitrust legality of
commercial boycotts. Because the per se doctrine allows a finding of antitrust liability with a minimal showing of restraint on competition, the
133. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
134. Id. at 414. Because of the growing number of indigent defendants seeking representation at the public defender's office, attorneys in private practice were appointed and
compensated, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, to accept the overflow cases from the
public defenders office and provide the needed legal representation. Id. at 415. At an Association meeting, the attorneys agreed that the only viable way to get an increase in fees
was to stop accepting new cases and that the boycott should aim for a minimal increase in
attorney pay rates. Id. at 416. The attorneys prepared and signed the following petition:
We, the undersigned private criminal lawyers practicing in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, agree that unless we are granted a substantial increase
in our hourly rate we will cease accepting new appointments under the Criminal
Justice Act.
Id. Pursuant to their petition, about 90 percent of the attorneys refused to accept any new
cases from the public defender's office. Id.
135. Id. at 420-21. The FTC filed a complaint against the SCTLA alleging that their
attorneys "had entered into an agreement among themselves and with other attorneys to
restrain trade" by refusing to accept new cases from the public defender's office. Id. at 418.
At a hearing, the administrative law judge found that the facts alleged by the FTC were
true. Id. Nevertheless the judge concluded that dismissal of the complaint was proper
because the boycott, in attracting lawyers in search of higher pay rates, had the beneficial
effect of lowering the overbearing caseload. Id. at 419. Disagreeing with the ALJ, the FTC
nonetheless issued the cease and desist order which was later vacated by the court of appeals. Id. at 420.
136. Id. at 422.
137. Id. at 432.
138. Id. at 433. Also, the Court noted that, not unlike a rule of reason analysis, the per
se standard assumes that prohibited commercial practices impact competition. Id.
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doctrine is well suited for application in deciding the legality of Internet
boycott actions, where the boundaries of on-line competition remain
undefined.
III.

ANALYSIS

As Internet users and service providers "collaborate in formulating
standards" for the provision of access services, "questions of antitrust
law [will] inevitably arise."13 9 Industry formulated standards have the
potential to injure service providers unable or unwilling to comply with
them. As a result, the courts may consider industry-wide voluntary
standards for Internet service providers as a restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 140 which prohibits unreasonable
14 1
restraints on interstate trade or commerce.
To date, "[n]o court has held that an association standardization pro142
gram, by itself, constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws."
"On the contrary, the courts have emphasized the basic legality of industry standardization."1 4 3 However, while the courts support the basic le139. Brody & Havighurst, supranote 87, at 199. Antitrust laws seek to prohibit collaboration between members of a trade profession that affects prices or the ability of others
within the trade or profession to compete. HEROLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 7. To
avoid antitrust liability, trade associations must monitor their collaborative activities to
ensure that anti-competitive effects do not result. Id. Failure by an association to take the
above precautions may result in the association becoming the target of antitrust enforcement proceedings by the government or other actions by either private parties or the government. Id. See Susan J. Braden, The Cutting Edge of Antitrust: Lessons From
Deregulation, Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Self-Regulation (June 13, 1988), reprinted in 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 809, 811 (1989) (setting forth antitrust complaint principles to
guide regulatory agencies in judging an administered standard).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or within
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ... ").
141. The United State Supreme Court once explained the underlying purpose for enacting the Sherman Act as follows:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions. But even were that premise open question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." Although this prohibition is literally all encompassing, the courts have
construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which "unreasonably" restrain competition.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
142. HEROLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 76.
143. Id. The favorable view by the courts of the basic legality of trade association standards has its origins in early Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Ass'n v.

1997]

DOWNFALL OF INTERNET SELF GOVERNANCE

151

gality of standardization programs, their application of antitrust laws to
144
these programs is "rife with uncertainty and outright confusion."
No consensus currently exists among the courts on whether standardization programs harm competition at all, therefore making it deserving of a restraint of trade classification. 1 4 5 Also, no agreement exists
within the courts regarding the application of a consistent antitrust rationale when using a given standard of review to evaluate standardization programs. 14 6 Consequently, the uncertainty inherent in the
application of antitrust laws to standardization programs make their
14 7
further application to the Internet a perplexing task.
Furthermore, little guidance exists with regard to on-line antitrust
case law, since only one party, Cyber Promotions, has to date brought an
antitrust action before a court for alleged on-line commerce violations.
Although the Pennsylvania district court in that action held that no section 2 violation of the Sherman Act occurred, the court inadvertently set
the stage for the occurrence of future section 1 violations to occur against
that same party by means of a group boycott by others.
This analysis will utilize the facts of this existing case to introduce
the present occurrence of an Internet group boycott against this party for
alleged violations of self-imposed Internet standards. Using this exam-

United States, 268 U.S. 563, 566 (1925) ("[D]efendants have engaged in many activities to
which no exception is taken by the government, and which are admittedly beneficial to the
industry and to consumers; such as ... the standardization and improvement of its products."); Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949) ("These standardizations
are deemed to be to the advantage of all concerned, including the consumer who, among
other benefits, is thereby better enabled to know what he is buying and to make intelligent
price comparisons.").
144. Gerla, supra note 57, at 471. While some courts suggest that benefits conferred
from standardization and accreditation programs do not play a role in determining the
affects of standards on trade, other courts warrant their consideration. Id.
145. Brody & Havighurst, supra note 87, at 199.
146. Id. For example, courts apply different justification reasons in applying a given
standard of review. Compare Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Engrs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (rejecting safety and health justification for association rule and emphasizing that, instead,
effect on competition was the standard for judging a challenged act or practice), with Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (setting forth the justification
of association rules in that manufacturers need to "assume direct responsibility for the
minimum safety and quality of their products").
147. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 4 (1970-71 Transfer Binder) CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
1718.20 (March 17, 1971) ("The difficulty [of approving a standard certification program] is
increased by the uncertainty which exists in the court decisions on this subject. Accordingly, the problems of establishing a program which will qualify for approval before it can
be seen in action are formidable.") (Federal Trade Commission advisory opinion to the
American National Standards Institute).
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pie, the analysis will illustrate how courts may apply 14 8 section 1 of the
Sherman Act to find occurrences of on-line violations of antitrust law,
therefore limiting Internet self-governance and expanding federal Internet regulation.

A.

CYBER PROMoTioNs V. AMERICA ONLNA'- PRELUDE TO A SECTION 1
SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION

Despite the aforementioned efforts of the Internet industry to selfgovern on-line advertising through the use of trade associations and
standards, a recent effort by a major on-line service to prevent the receipt of unsolicited, mass e-mail advertisements (spamming) resulted in
antitrust litigation. In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,
149 (hereinafter "Cyber Promotions") a Pennsylvania district court refused to grant a temporary restraining order that required an on-line
service to deliver plaintiff's unsolicited e-mail advertisements to
subscribers. 150
Cyber Promotions, is an Internet advertising firm that receives payment from businesses to send, en masse, unsolicited advertisement-bearing e-mail to the on-line public. 15 1 America Online, Inc. ("AOL"), an online service provider 5

2

having over 7,000,000153 users, was the target of

148. Benjamin Cardozo once stated that a judge considers factors of history and analogy
while "making" law. BENJAMIN A. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDICLAu

PROCESS 53-54

(1991). Cardozo stated:
I do not mean that the directive force of history, even when its claims are most
assertive, confines the law of the future to uninspired repetition of the law of the
present and past. I mean simply that history, in illuminating the past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future.
Id. Lawmakers, faced with regulating new technologies, may proceed as recommended by
Cardozo, searching history for the right analogy. Id.
149. Cyber Promotions Inc. v. America Online Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
150. Id. at 438, 446. The controversy began when America Online, Inc. ("AOL") advised
Cyber Promotions, in a letter dated January 26, 1996, that AOL disapproved with Cyber
Promotions' transmission of unsolicited e-mail to AOL members over the Internet. Id. at
437 As an alleged retaliatory act, AOL subsequently sent a number of bulk e-mail transmissions to Cyber Promotions' Internet service provider (ISP"), causing it to shut down.
Id. Cyber Promotions subsequently filed Civil Action No. 96-2486 against AOL on March,
1996, in a Pennsylvania district court. Id. Cyber Promotions alleged that, "as a result of
AOL's [disabling bulk e-mail transmission], two of Cyber Promotions' ISP's terminated
their relationship with Cyber Promotions and a third refused to enter into a contract with
Cyber Promotions." Id. AOL, in turn, filed a complaint against Cyber Promotions in a
district court. Id. On July 24, 1996, the Virginia district court hearing AOL's complaint
transferred the action to the Pennsylvania district court hearing Cyber Promotions' complaint because the two had "arise[n] from the same nucleus of operative facts .... " Id. at
438.
151. Id. at 439 n.13.
152. Id. at 438 n.3.
153. Id. at 449 n.22.
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much of Cyber Promotions' mailings.15 4 AOL gathered all of Cyber Promotions' unsolicited messages and returned them to Cyber Promotions in
in service to
a bulk e-mail transmission, 155 causing an 15interruption
6
Cyber Promotions' Internet service provider.
Under continued threat from such further mailings, the service provider thereafter refused to provide further on-line access to Cyber Promotions. 15 7 Cyber Promotions, as a result, sued AOL in a Pennsylvania
district court alleging, amongst other wrongs, 158 violations of antitrust
law. 15 9 Specifically, Cyber Promotions alleged that "AOL obtained a monopoly in the market for providing direct marketing advertising material
via electronic transmission to AOL's own subscribers in violation of sec154. Id. at 437. On average, Cyber Promotions sent AOL approximately 1 million email messages per day. Id. at 452.
155. Cyber Promotions referred to these bulk mailings as 'e-mail bombs." Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 437 n.1. Cyber Promotions alleged that AOL transmitted "e-mail
bombs" with intent to cripple Cyber Promotions ISP by gathering all unsolicited e-mail sent
by Cyber Promotions and returning them to Cyber Promotions in a bulk transmission. Id.
156. Cyber Promotions experienced difficulty in sending much of its e-mail to AOL subscribers because many of the target AOL addresses changed. William S. Galkin, Unpalatable Span Has Big Online Services Boiling, BALT. Bus. J., Nov. 15, 1996, available in 1996
WL 11828484. Thus, when Cyber Promotions attempted to send e-mail to non-current
AOL e-mail addresses, AOL's computer "bounced" the messages back to Cyber Promotions
as undeliverable. Id. The excessive quantity of messages returned to Cyber Promotions
burdened the computers of Cyber Promotions Internet service provider. Id. To avoid this
complication, Cyber Promotions inserted a false return address in all e-mail messages sent
to AOL, using the AOL e-mail address as both the mailing address and the return address.
Id. After AOL discovered that Cyber Promotions was the true source of these mailings,
AOL accumulated and returned the mass of messages, in a single mailing, to Cyber Promotions' service provider. Id. This bulk mailing disrupted the network servers of Cyber Promotions service provider. Id.
157. See Cyber Promotions,948 F. Supp. at 437 ("[Als a result of AOL's 'e-mail bombing,'
two of Cyber Promotions' [Internet service providers] ISPs terminated their relationship
with Cyber Promotions and a third refused to enter into a contract with Cyber
Promotions.").
158. Cyber Promotions original complaint asserted a claim for violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and state law claims for both intentional interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. Id. Cyber Promotions later amended the complaint by adding a declaratory
judgment claim that sought a 'declaration that [Cyber had] the right to send to AOL members via the Internet unsolicited e-mail advertisements." Id. AOL's complaint against
Cyber Promotions alleged service and trade name infringement, service mark and trade
name dilution, false designation of origin, false advertising, unfair competition, violations
of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Virginia Computer Crimes Act. Id. AOL later
amended its complaint to include claims for misappropriation, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Id.
159. Id. at 457-58. Cyber brought the antitrust allegation as an amendment to its first
amended complaint. Id.
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tion 2 of the Sherman Act." 160 Cyber Promotions objected to AOL's implementation of an e-mail filtering device 16 1 that required AOL
subscribers to choose affirmatively to receive "junk e-mail." 162 Cyber
Promotions' section 2 claim alleged that the ability to advertise to AOL
subscribers over the Internet, via e-mail, constituted an "essential facility" and that AOL refused to deal with Cyber Promotions by prohibiting
AOL users from viewing Cyber Promotions' e-mail without taking affirm63
ative steps.1
However, the court ruled that Cyber Promotions was not likely to
win under an "essential facilities" section 2 antitrust claim because AOL
64
did not totally prohibit Cyber Promotions from accessing its system.1
AOL did not prohibit the receipt of Cyber Promotions' messages, but instead allowed AOL's subscribers to choose whether or not to receive
Cyber Promotions' e-mail. 16 5 Moreover, AOL's fitering software did not
prevent Cyber Promotions from accessing AOL subscribers through the
U.S. mail system, telemarketing efforts, newspaper ads, or other traditional means.16 6 Because of the existence of these other means for accessing AOL subscribers, AOL's e-mail system did not constitute the
"essential facility of access" required for Cyber Promotions to bring a sec67
tion 2 antitrust violation.1
Finally, the court stated that Cyber Promotions could avoid AOL's
voluntary blocking software for unsolicited e-mail by "[s]end[ing] its advertisements to the subscribers of the many other on-line services [not
utilizing blocking software] which compete with AOL, including Compuserve, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy." 168 "Cyber could [also] attempt to lure AOL subscribers away from AOL by developing its own
160. Id. at 458.
161. AOL called this device "Preferred Mail-The Guard Against Junk E-Mail." Id. at
459. The device enabled AOL to receive Cyber's e-mail advertisements for only those AOL
subscribers who wished to receive them. Id.
162. Id. Cyber objected to the device because it placed an "onus on the AOL subscriber
to take affirmative steps to access Cyber's e-mail by checking off a box on the screen having
the caption 'I want junk e-mail' and because it grouped 'legitimate' advertisers such as
Cyber with pornographic advertisers, thereby discouraging the AOL subscriber to choose to
receive Cyber's e-mail." Id.
163. Id. at 460.
164. Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 463.
165. Id. at 463.
We believe there is little likelihood that Cyber will be able to show that the ability
to advertise to AOL's subscribers is vital to Cyber's competitive ability ....
AOL
has not even completely excluded Cyber from the AOL system. AOL's Preferred
Mail simply gives the AOL subscribers the option to choose whether he wishes to
view Cyber's e-mail advertisements.

Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 464.
168. Id.
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commercial on-line system or advertising web site and charging a com16 9
petitive rate."
In holding that no section 2 violation of the Sherman Act occurred,
the court plainly assumed the availability of a market outside of AOL to
allow Cyber Promotions to continue its business practice of sending unsolicited advertisements to the on-line public. 170 However, numerous
on-line services have either resisted efforts by Cyber Promotions to reach
their customers with e-mail 17 1 or have not allowed Cyber Promotions to
utilize their service to gain access to the Internet altogether. 1 72 For example, Concentric Network Corp., Compuserve Inc. and Sprint's Netcom
have all discontinued providing Internet access service to Cyber
Promotions. 173
Furthermore, bandwidth providers may be unwilling to grant
bandwidth to Cyber Promotions to enable it to create its own Internet
service provider business. Pursuant to Judge Weiner's suggestion in
Cyber Promotions that Cyber Promotions become an independent ISP to
lure away AOL subscribers desiring on-line advertisements, Sanford
Wallace, president of Cyber Promotions, decided to launch his own Internet service provider business.' 74 However, as stated above, Wallace
may encounter difficulty with this effort. In predicting Cyber Promo-

Id.
170. See id. at 464.
Merely defining the relevant market as Cyber has done by the subscribership of
AOL without further distinguishing AOL's subscribers from the other on-line subscribers... begs the question of whether the subscribership to AOL is an essential
facility ....
Cyber has failed to show why its advertising to AOL subscribers is
any more vital than its advertising to the subscribers of the many other commercial on-line services ....
Id.
171. See, e.g., Compuserve Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (granting injunction to Compuserve to prevent Cyber Promotions from sending unsolicited e-mail to Compuserve's computer equipment); see also Concentric Network Corp. v.
Wallace, No. C-96-20829-RMW (EAI), (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1996) available in <http://
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/concentl.html> (granting injunction to Concentric Network
Corp. to prevent Cyber Promotions from sending unsolicited e-mail to Concentric's
subscribers).
172. See Dan Goodlin, Judge Weighs ISP vs. Spammer (visited Sept. 30, 1997) <http://
www.news.com/News ... 2c4%2C14429%2C00.htmlind> (federal judge to decide whether
backbone provider AGIS must reconnect Cyber Promotions' on-line service to the Internet);
see also Kornblum, supranote 24 ("Cyber Promotions has been kicked off of at least 20 ISPs
in less than three years.").
173. See Court to Decide Whether Spamming is Trespassing, INRAcTIVE DAILY, Dec.
17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13462491 [hereinafter Court to Decide] ("After being
bumped off Compuserve and Concentric... Cyber was kicked off Sprint's Netcom and other
major national ISPs.").
174. Kornblum, supra note 24.
169.
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tions' forthcoming difficulty in procuring bandwidth to launch an independent service, a critic of Cyber Promotions stated the following:
He can set up some little podunk attempt [to launch an independent
service], but [as] soon as he does, [the bandwidth providers] are going to
get the message loud and clear that [they] just signed up a loser ....
He'll be on for a little while. Ultimately, [they] might as well tell him
that he just might [as well] give it up now because he's never going to
find a permanent home. The reality is he's been chased out of everywhere he's hooked to. We'll continue
to chase him until there are no
75
dark corners for him to hide.'
Hence, under the guise of an enforcement of Internet conduct standards, service and bandwidth providers may act in accordance to this
chilling statement by denying bandwidth or service to Cyber Promotions.
Therefore, although the Cyber Promotions court did not find that a section 2 antitrust violation existed because America Online did not constitute a monopoly, the collective actions of multiple ISPs may nonetheless
constitute a boycott that may result in a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act.
B.

SELF-GOVERNANCE OF INTERNET E-MAIL AFTER CYBER PROMOTIONS
V. AMERICA ONIINE: THE LIKELIHOOD FOR OCCURRENCE OF
AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT

Under Internet self-governance principles, the enforcement of conduct standards can make the Internet a hostile environment for an online business not acting in accordance with such standards. However,
where the "wrongful conduct" of the business does not violate existing
laws, the enforcement of these Internet conduct standards may themselves result in a violation of law. 176
175. Id. (discussing the futility of Cyber Promotions' efforts to establish an independent
Internet provision service that encourages the sending and receipt of unsolicited advertisement e-mail).
176. For example, after Cyber Promotions began disseminating large quantities of commercial e-mail to America Online subscribers, AOL attempted to block all of Cyber promotion e-mail from reaching AOL subscribers. Cyber Promotions Inc. v. America Online Inc.,
No. 96-2486, 1996 WL 565818 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996). Cyber Promotions thereafter sought
an injunction to prevent AOL from blocking its e-mail. Id. After hearing oral argument on
Cyber Promotions' motion for a preliminary injunction and after reviewing the parties' submissions on the motion, the court temporarily restrained AOL, until the time of trial, from
blocking Cyber Promotions' e-mail to AOL recipients and from interfering with Cyber Promotions' business relationships with its Internet service providers. Id. See Janet Kornblum, Short Take: ACLU Challenges South Dakota Net Law (visited Mar. 3, 1997) <http:ll
www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,6334,00.html> (ACLU launched an investigation to determine whether the state of South Dakota violated the First Amendment when it blocked the
receipt by state employees of all e-mail sent by a specific ISP regarding a controversy involving Native Americans).
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The current treatment of Cyber Promotions by Internet service and
bandwidth providers illustrates this very principle. Although Cyber Promotions has not violated any existing law' 77 by sending unsolicited email advertisements to on-line users, Internet service providers presently engage in what some may classify as anti-competitive behavior.
Presently, at least twenty Internet service or bandwidth providers have
prohibited Cyber Promotions from accessing the Internet 7 8 while others
have blocked their receipt of Cyber Promotions' e-mail transmissions,
causing Cyber Promotions to lose revenue.1 79 Such commercial activity
is deserved of section 1 antitrust analysis.
1. Section 1 Antitrust Analysis: The ConcertedActions of Service or
Bandwidth Providers
Under the doctrine of "conscious parallelism," one may infer the
existence of an agreement between parties if the parties' parallel conduct
is supported by "plus factors."' 8 0 The parallel conduct of Internet service
or bandwidth providers is obvious; they either deny Internet access to
Cyber Promotions or they prohibit the receipt of Cyber Promotions' email. i8 ' Thus, to establish the existence of a concerted action between
Internet service or bandwidth providers, one must prove the existence of
82
the requisite plus factors.'
One such plus factor is the attendance of trade association meetings
by industry competitors.1 8 3 Because trade associations by their very nature bring together competitors, the conduct of the association potentially involves two evils that antitrust policies strive to prevent: (1)
collusion by competitors in restraint of trade; and (2) unfair actions by a
limited number of members that may unfairly benefit some members at
the expense of other members or non member competitors.' 8 4 Internet
177. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 172-73.
179. See Court to Decide, supra note 173 (explaining that Cyber Promotions has had
trouble honoring its contracts with clients after on-line services began blocking their receipt of Cyber's e-mail transmissions).
180. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.

182. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
184. MORSE & WATERS, supra note 59, at 67; see LAMB & SHIELDS, supra note 51, at 232.
For testimony of an association member made before the Federal Trade Commission with
regard to collusive price discussions at trade association meetings, see In re Chain Institute, Inc. Docket No. 4878; 1957 Trade Cases 1 68, 757.
Well, frankly, you know what you do at these meetings. You hear a lot of tripe and
a lot of crap and red tape which they put through, and they put on a lot of rigmarole and put you on these committees doing a lot of things .... But after we get rid
of a lot of this stuff, maybe while we are at lunch or adjourning for a drink or
something, then we start talking .... I could go on and on and on, but want to say

158

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVI

trade associations already hold meetings attended by industry competitors.1

5

Hence, under existing case law, attendance at such meetings by

service and bandwidth providers may satisfy the plus factor requirement
to prove the existence of concerted activity against Cyber Promotions.
In Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,

86

(hereinafter "Bray")a number of

cattlemen brought an action against a large retail grocery chain alleging
antitrust violations for conspiring to regulate beef prices.1 8 7 The cattlemen alleged that the grocer, a member of the National Association of
Food Chains ("NAFC"), used association meetings as a vehicle to conspire with other grocery chains.' 8 8 Although the defendant grocer argued that no negative inferences existed with regard to its association
meetings, 18 9 the cattlemen presented the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator stating that meat prices were a discussion topic of a meeting. 19 0
The cattlemen also presented evidence that an aura of secrecy frequently
surrounded such meetings. 191 The Northern District Court of California
held that, although no evidence of an express agreement to fix prices existed, the fact that price discussions took place during association meet192
ings was of paramount importance.
Citing a Ninth Circuit decision 19 3 holding that such evidence proved
sufficient in absence of an express agreement, the court held that the
opportunity to fix prices, together with actual price discussion at association meetings, was sufficient to support a price fixing conspiracy.1 94 "As
that when any two businessmen get together, whether it is a Chain Institute meeting or a bible class meeting, if they happen to belong to the same industry just as
soon as the prayers have been said, they start talking about the conditions of the
industry, and it is bound definitely to gravitate... to the price structure in the
industry. What else is there to talk about?
Id.
185. See supra note 65.
186. Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
187. Id. at 855. Originally, the cattlemen brought the action against three large retail
grocery chains, but two of the defendants settled. Id.
188. Id. at 856.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 857.
191. Id. "The meeting topics, agenda, and minutes were confidential and generally unavailable." Id. Meeting attendees all wore color-coded badges to preserve their anonymity
at the meetings instead of wearing badges bearing their names and company representations. Id. Finally, grocer officials were reluctant at trial to admit or discuss their participation in association meetings. Id.
192. Id.
193. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952) ("It is
uncontroverted that this committee held meetings at which [the defendant], as well as representatives of the other defendant corporations, was present .... That an opportunity was
thus afforded to discuss and agree upon prices and pricing policies on an industry-wide
basis, cannot be denied.").
194. Bray, 392 F. Supp 851 at 859.
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is usual in cases such as this [sic], there exists no proof of a formal agreement between the [defendant] and the co-conspirators... [y]et, the law
contemplates that seldom will direct proof of a conspiracy be available." 19 5 Hence, "the jury could have reasonably concluded that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the NAFC was .

.

. a vehicle through

which the conspiracy was nurtured and implemented." 19 6 Thus, as
demonstrated by Bray, Cyber Promotions need only prove that discussions regarding "Internet service denials" or a "prohibition of e-mail receipts" took place at an association meeting attended by service or
bandwidth providers to satisfy the "plus factor" requirement that the
parties acted in concert.
Another plus factor available to Cyber Promotions for proving the
concerted actions of Internet providers engaging in parallel conduct is
the presence of hostile statements made by them, to include disparaging
19 7
remarks and classification of Cyber Promotions within "blacklists."
As indicated at the beginning of this analysis, such statements have recently become commonplace on the Internet. 198
In Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, (hereinafter "Park") a real estate
broker filed suit against the board of realtors and numerous real estate
companies alleging that defendants, in retaliation for his attempts to cut
real estate commissions, conspired to boycott him. 19 9 The defendants
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence set forth to prove a section 1
antitrust violation. 20 0 Park had introduced evidence demonstrating the
195. Id. at 861.

196. Id. at 859.
197. Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1059-61 (5th. Cir. 1985) (holding
that a concerted refusal to deal and hostile comments were sufficient plus factors for a
finding of conspiracy); Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143,
1148-49 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
defendant where plus factors such as hostile comments and blacklisting were present). But
see Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400,
1406-07 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant's comments that plaintiff was "no good,
unethical, worthless and generally of bad repute" did not "add up to a conspiracy by the
[defendants] to restrain trade").
198. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
199. Park, 764 F.2d at 1057. The El Paso Board of Realtors was a non-profit trade organization having approximately 2000 brokers and sales people-roughly half of the
number of total brokers and sales people in El Paso. Id. at 1058. Park charged homeowners a flat sales fee instead of a percentage-based commission because Park believed that
.no relation existed between the work and expense involved in selling a home and [the
home's] price." Id. After initially posting record sales, Park's sales fell drastically, causing
him to sell his real estate practice. See id. at 1058-59. Although some attributed the decline in Park's sales to the fluctuating real estate market, Park attributed the decline in
sales to the conspiring, competing brokers. Id. at 1059.
200. Id.
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parallel conduct of the defendants 2 0 1 and proving that the defendants
made disparaging remarks about him, including statements questioning
20 2
his reputation.
Citing an Eighth Circuit decision 20 3 finding similar evidence sufficient to withstand a summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit Appellate
Court found the disparaging remarks sufficient to sustain a jury finding
of conspiracy to boycott under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 20 4 In light
of the Park decision, Cyber Promotions may prove the concerted action of
Internet providers acting in parallel against it by showing that they
made disparaging remarks concerning the way that it conducts business.
Because Internet bandwidth and service providers are presently engaging in the parallel conduct required to either deny bandwidth to Cyber
Promotions or refuse their e-mail transmissions, the foregoing cases allow them to prove their concerted action in alleging an antitrust violation against them.
2. Section 1 Antitrust Analysis: Restraint of Trade and the
Application of the Per Se Doctrine of Boycott Illegality
Courts may apply a per se doctrine when deciding the antitrust legality of a commercial boycott, thus allowing a finding of antitrust liability of defendants with a minimal showing of restraint on competition.
The case applying this doctrine having a factual background most similar to that existing with regard to the boycott actions of Internet providers against Cyber Promotions is Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas,
Light & Coke Co. 20 5 (hereinafter "Radiant").

In Radiant, a gas burner manufacturer, Radiant, brought action
against an association and its members, including suppliers of natural
gas, alleging a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act. 20 6 The complaint

alleged that the association and its members conspired to restrain inter201. Id. Park presented evidence of practices of other real estate brokers that discriminated against him and interfered with his attempts to charge a fixed commission. Id. For
example, other brokers, when providing purchasers for Park's listings, "attempted to raise
the commission fee to seven percent of the selling price despite the fact that [Park]... had
originally listed the property with a flat fee." Id. Conversely, when Park sold the listings of
other realtors, those brokers sometimes attempted to split the commission fee in a way
unfair to him. Id.
202. Id. The disparaging remarks included statements by competing brokers to customers that Park was not reputable, equitable and did a poor job in selling his listings. Id.
Other brokers told customers that they "avoided him like the plague" when doing business.
Id. at 1060.
203. Penne, 604 F.2d at 1143, 1148-49 (stating that blacklisting and deprecatory statements by defendants "could... constitute violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.").
204. Park, 764 F.2d at 1060.
205. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
206. Id. at 657.
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state commerce in the manufacture, sale and use of Radiant's gas burners by reason of the association's unreasonable failure to approve them,
resulting in a refusal by utility members of the association to supply gas
for the burner's use. 20 7 The Supreme Court held that the association

members' concerted refusal to supply gas to Radiant's burners consti208
tuted a boycott in per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The court cited Klor's 209 for the proposition that the association and
its members effectuated an unlawful combination and conspiracy under
section 1 of the Sherman Act by refusing to supply gas to Radiant's burners, not approved by the association members. 2 10 The court implied that
no rational reason existed for the association to disapprove of Radiant's
burners where no differences existed between Radiant's burners and
those bearing the association's seal. 21 1 As stated by the court: "It is obvious that [Radiant] cannot sell its gas burners .

.

. if, because of the al-

2 12
leged conspiracy, the purchasers cannot buy gas for those burners.
"The conspirational [sic] refusal to provide gas for use in [Radiant's]

burners because they are not approved by [the association] . . . falls

within one of the classes of restraint which... are unduly restrictive and
hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute."2 13 The court
207. Id. at 658. The Association operated testing laboratories that determined the
safety, utility and durability of the gas burners. Id. It affixed a "seal of approval" on those
gas burners that it determined to have passed its tests. Id. Radiant alleged that the association allowed Radiant's competitor's to influence the testing procedure instead of basing
the tests on "objective standards." Id. Radiant twice submitted its burner to the association for approval, to no avail. Id. Radiant thereafter asserted that its burners exceeded the
safety, utility and durability of burners already bearing the association's seal of approval.
Id. Radiant also asserted that, because the association and its members conspired in refusing to provide gas to burners not bearing association approval, their actions resulted in the
exclusion of Radiant's burners from the market. Id. Finally, Radiant asserted that, because potential customers would not purchase burners for which they could not obtain gas,
Radiant suffered a loss of substantial profits. Id.
208. Id. at 659-60. One authority contends that scholars and others regularly misread
the holding by identifying the allegedly unreasonable denial by the association of the seal
of approval as the unlawful boycott and not the concerted refusal of association members to
supply gas. Brody & Havighurst, supra note 87, at 213. The classification is more than
semantic because it allows for two different interpretations as to the identification of the
boycotting party-perhaps changing the outcome of a later case, depending on whether or
not the boycotting party is an actual competitor of the plaintiff. See id. For an example of
the asserted misinterpretation of the holding, see, e.g., Gerla, supra note 57, at 501 ("The
Court held that the denial of the... seal of approval to a competitor of some members of
the association constituted a per se illegal group boycott.").
209. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
210. Radiant, 364 U.S. at 658-59.
211. Id. at 659.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 659-60. The court further classified the defendant's actions as having the
nature and character of a monopolistic tendency. Id. at 660. Thus, the alleged conspirato-

162

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVI

then concluded by noting that it would not tolerate such actions merely
2 14
because a business is small and has little impact on the economy.

Applying Radiant analysis to the facts surrounding the refusal of
Internet providers to supply Cyber Promotions with bandwidth or to allow receipt of Cyber Promotions' e-mail, their actions would likely constitute a boycott in per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Not
unlike association members who wrongly refused to supply natural gas
to Radiant's burners lacking association approval, Internet providers refuse to supply bandwidth to Cyber Promotions or receive their e-mail
because on-line associations do not support its e-mail practices. Like Radiant, such activity has caused economic damage to Cyber Promotions
because they cannot service its customers in absence of either.
Furthermore, whereas Radiant asserted that their gas burners were
no different in quality then those bearing the association's seal, Cyber
Promotions' advertising methods are no more intrusive or unethical than
those practiced by Internet service providers not disapproved by on-line
associations. 2 15 Finally, like the plaintiff in Radiant, the courts should
not tolerate any antitrust injustice against Cyber Promotions merely because it is not as expansive as other Internet service providers with regard to its on-line customer base. Thus, in light of the holding in
Radiant, the actions of Internet providers, in refusing to grant
bandwidth to Cyber Promotions or receive Cyber Promotions' e-mail,
may result in a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
3. Additional Factors of Considerationin Support of Findingan
Antitrust Violation
A danger exists where an antitrust defendant's actions of self regulation amount to "an extra judicial agency encroaching on the judicial
and legislative domains." 216 In Fashion Originators,Justice Black condemned the guild for creating "an extra-governmental agency, which proscribed rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and
provides extra-judicial tribunals for the determination and punishment
of violations, and thus trenches upon the power of the national legislarial refusal to provide gas for use in Radiant's burners interfered "with the natural flow of
interstate commerce." Id.
214. Id. at 660.
215. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
216. Robert Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept 'GroupBoycott', 39
VAND. L. Rv. 1507, 1590 (1986). "Of concern is the fact that highly self interested parties

may arrogate to themselves quasi-governmental police functions that belong, according to
the courts, only to the government .... A related impulse is the judicial hostility towards
vigilantism-a private group's attempt to make and impose behavioral rules on others."
Id.
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ture and violates the statute . ... "217 Also, in Silver, the court held that
self regulatory conduct or any other action repealing governmental laws
is not favored.2 18 Therefore, if the self regulatory conduct of associations
and their respective members encroach upon any legislative or judicial
domain of the U.S. government, a court may summarily condemn the
action as unlawful.
4. A Proposal to Dissuade Governmental Intervention of Internet
Regulation Through the Avoidance of On-Line Antitrust
Violations
For those parties or individuals opposing governmental regulation of
the Internet, a proposal for avoidance of antitrust violations is in order.
On-line parties can avoid antitrust illegality by ensuring that their conduct does not satisfy the requisite elements of an antitrust violation.
Hence, on-line parties, when enforcing common on-line rules or standards, should ensure that: (1) their actions are not "in concert;"2 19 (2)
their enforcement mechanism, if boycott, does not satisfy the per se docencroach on
trine of antitrust illegality;2 20 (3) and their actions do not
22 1
the legislative or judicial domain of the U.S. government.
Internet service or bandwidth providers, who together enforce antispamming standards through the denial of service or bandwidth to online companies in the business of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements, must avoid practices ("plus factors") which bolster the inference
that they "acted in concert." Therefore, if these parties attend common
meetings, they must document the meeting to record that they did not
discuss denials of bandwidth or service to a boycotted on-line company. 22 2 Furthermore, these same parties must avoid making disparaging remarks about the way the boycotted company conducts its
business. 223 Failure to 'take these protective measures can lead to the
inference by a court that the boycotting companies acted "in concert,"
thus satisfying one of the elements required to prove an antitrust
224
violation.
Also, service or bandwidth providers must first evaluate their decision to prohibit an on-line company of service or bandwidth because the
per se doctrine requires only a minimal showing of a restraint of trade of
217. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 116.
219. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 103, 116 and accompanying text.
222. ComEGYs, supra note 95, at 111; HERoLD & WEBSTER, supra note 74, at 129; LAMB
& S=LDs, supra note 51, at 237; see supra notes 86, 184 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 86, 175, 197, 199-204 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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a boycotted party for finding the occurrence of an antitrust violation. 22 5
If the companies thus seek to enforce spamming prohibitions, they must
justify their proposed boycott actions by ensuring that detrimental differences exist between the spamming on-line advertising method and those
2 2 6
methods that they currently allow.
Boycotting companies must therefore ensure that the spamming
practices of an on-line company have detrimental effects on their system
and users while the permitted advertising methods do not. Such detrimental effects may include costs incurred by the user though the expenditure of on-line time required to read unsolicited e-mail and computer
system costs incurred by the company in having to store and process the
data comprising the advertisements. 2 27 If no differences exist and their
eventual boycott actions have a minimal detrimental effect on the boycotted company's commercial viability, a court may interpret their actions as unduly restrictive and in violation of section 1 antitrust laws. 228
A court may be more inclined to make such an interpretation if the boycotted company is small and has little impact on the economy while the
22 9
boycotting company is of larger economical stature.
Finally, before on-line companies consider boycotting a company not
following on-line standards that forbid spamming, that company must
first ensure that state or federal laws do not exist which themselves prohibit the practice. Currently, legislators within many states are drafting
laws which prohibit the practice of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements. 230 If these bills go into effect, a court may interpret a company's
subsequent boycott enforcement of non-government imposed Internet
standards as an encroachment on the judiciary branch of that state.
Since such encroachment is strongly disfavored by the courts, it may influence a court to decide against an encroaching boycotting party when
231
making an antitrust decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment demonstrated that increased Internet commercialism results in the development of an on-line advertising method that is
subject to considerable controversy. This Comment also demonstrated
that, although Internet users and on-line industries may attempt to self225. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.

226. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. For examples of Internet advertising
methods which are "allowed", see Brown & Raysman, see supranote 12, at 3; see also supra
note 15.
227. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 211, 213 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
230. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 103, 116 and accompanying text.
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regulate this controversial advertising method through the creation and
enforcement of association standards, exercise of such standards may violate antitrust laws. Because the Internet will continue to grow, so will
on-line commercialism, self-governmental attempts by Internet parties
to regulate it, and, if these parties are not careful, antitrust violations.
Such violations will result in either: (1) an increase in judicial exercise
to correct the anti-competitive results of overly aggressive self-governance principles; or (2) in the enactment of new legislation 23 2 to replace
faulty self-governing principles. Inevitably, this increased involvement
of state and federal governmental authority will spell the demise of Internet self-governance.
David A Gottardo

232. Legislation for the regulation of Internet e-mail advertisement, as of this comment's writing, is currently pending approval in several states. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.

